“What Bush Said: The War on Terror and the Rhetorical Situation”

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About the Author

Ross Fitzpatrick is an undergraduate student at the University of Kansas, double majoring in English and Political Science. He is also a member of the university’s policy debate team and the Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society.

Contents

Introduction

Methods: Rhetorical Analysis

Analysis/Results: Events Producing Speech

Analysis/Results: Speech Producing Action

Conclusion

References

Appendix A: Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework Graphic

Appendix B: Table of Speeches and Rhetorical Roles Identified

Analysis/Results: Speech Producing Action

Role 1: Future Scenarios

Unable to identify a clear and specific set of conditions necessitating speech, I move to the second dynamic: speeches creating the impetus for action, or, in Kingdon’s terminology, opening policy windows. The first role of rhetoric in defining the Bush Administration’s public policy during the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the rhetorical linkages the President made between those responsible for the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. I identified this dynamic’s presence in 6 of the 17 speeches, with a notable increase in the leadup to the invasion of Iraq beginning in late 2002. By constructing future scenarios in which Iraq developed nuclear weapons and handed them to terrorists, Bush increases the threat of the regime and frames the War in Iraq as an extension of the War on Terror. Therefore, Bush manipulates the problem stream and the politics stream by exaggerating the extent or risk of the problem resulting in a priming effect that focuses the American populace’s attention on the threat of terrorism. And in kind, Bush manipulates the policy stream by claiming military intervention to be the only possible response to said problem.

As early as the First State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, Bush mentions the potential of a threat from Iraq in connection with terrorist activity. Bush infamously declared “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” The rhetoric of the "axis of evil" intimately combined Iraq with Al-Qaeda, and posed them as a singular threat although the extent to which Iraq supported the group, or terrorism writ large, was unclear. In the same speech Bush says Iraq “could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred,” clearly projecting a potential future rather than describing the status quo. Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner conducted a wide-reaching content analysis of the Bush Administration’s rhetoric from 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq to determine the effect of such rhetoric on the American public’s support for the War on Terror and the War in Iraq (Gershkoff and Kushner 525). Their evidence suggests that by connecting Saddam Hussein to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and frequently mentioning the two separate groups in the same speeches, Bush created a "good versus evil" dichotomy that increased support for his agenda (Gershkoff and Kushner 525). This addition is important because it not only analyzes what Bush said, but demonstrates that his rhetoric worked. That is, it actively changed the public’s attitude toward his Administration and its policies.

In October of 2002, Bush delivered a speech at a rally in Cincinnati dedicated exclusively to the threat posed by Iraq. Almost immediately, Bush connects Saddam to the events of 9/11, saying “On September the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability—even to threats that gather on the other side of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.” Using the language of “terror” loosely, Bush seems to define Iraq as a terrorist organization itself, specifically recalling the fresh memories of September 11. Bush also attempts to preempt potential criticisms of the action, claiming, “Many Americans have raised legitimate questions: about the nature of the threat; about the urgency of action—why be concerned now; about the link between Iraq developing weapons of terror, and the wider war on terror.” Bush provides somewhat roundabout answers to these concerns by arguing that “Iraq and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy—the United States of America” and that “Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists.” He also argues that “confronting the threat posed by Iraq is crucial to winning the war on terror.” Again we can see the rhetorical connections between terrorism in Iraq and the possibility of devastating action that requires preemption. Delivering an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on March 17, 2003, Bush cuts off the possibility of diplomatic action when he delivers the line: “The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now.”

In each of these speeches Bush echoes the implications of his preemptive defense posture by “conflat[ing] present and future,” making potential threats seem more imminent, dangerous, and in need of immediate response (Dunmire 506). Just as discussed before, Bush rhetorically enacts policy by manipulating the decision calculus. Emphasizing the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction falling into the hands of terrorists, Bush downplays the potential negative consequences of failure and avoids a discussion of the likelihood of such a threat occurring. Bush scripts magnitude over probability, which circumvents a discussion about the actual evidence of the regime’s possession of devastating military technology. Even after the fall of the regime in Iraq, no Weapons of Mass Destruction were found. This emphasizes the importance of Presidential rhetoric, which, in this case, clearly created a reality that did not exist.

Role 2: Identity Crisis

The second role rhetoric played in the time period analyzed is in the construction of an American identity crisis which appealed to traditional Christian morality and the concept that “American” identity was under attack from external forces. Even in Bush’s first address to the nation following the September 11 attacks, Bush remarked “our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.” Bush echoed this sentiment in 10 of the 17 speeches analyzed. In a speech on December 11, 2001, Bush declared “we will honor the memory of the 11th day by doing our duty as citizens of this great country, freedom's home and freedom's defender.” And in the Second State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003, defending his position on Iraq, he told Congress “Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.” This last line in particular demonstrates the effect of such rhetoric in cutting off the possibility of democratic deliberation concerning his Middle East policy.

Framing efforts as a defense of freedom itself, Bush couches his policy in moralistic terms which deflects focus from concrete details of implementation. Again Bush frames the problem and politics streams by directing the public’s attention toward their “Americanness” and expanding the scope of the problem to a threat to the American way of life. Therefore, as Thomas Goodnight argues in his rhetorical analysis of Congressional debates surrounding the invasion of Iraq, rhetoric was an essential part of the actions that made the Iraq War a reality, and in fact outweighed more pragmatic or material calculations of reducing terrorism or the threat of use of WMDs (Goodnight 66). Bush used this strategy to supplement role 1 by not only exaggerating the material consequences of inaction but adding moral deterioration to the list of threats posed by terrorism and Iraq.

Not only does Bush frequently refer to traditional American systems of political value, but also religious morality and historical allegories. Bush ends nearly every speech analyzed with some variation of the phrase “God bless America” but also more explicitly ties decision making to Christian beliefs and attitudes. In the first address to the nation, he cites a Bible verse from the book of Psalms. Concluding the Second State of the Union, Address Bush says “We Americans have faith in ourselves—but not in ourselves alone. We do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life, and all of history.” As Denise Bostdorff argues, Bush invokes “the rhetoric of the covenant” which alludes to concepts of good and evil and a struggle to do the “right” thing (Bostdorff 312). This shapes political opinion over a specific issue by reframing and recontextualizing traditional tropes of American identity.

Similarly, Bush invokes the recent historical memory of events like the Cold War to spark nationalist fervor and limit deliberation in public spaces like the media. In his “The World Will Always Remember 9/11” speech, Bush remarks “Our enemies have made the mistake that America's enemies always make. They saw liberty and thought they saw weakness. And now, they see defeat.” And at a commencement speech at the United States Military Academy, Bush specifically echoes the ideological conflict of the Cold War by saying “In this way our struggle is similar to the Cold War. Now, as then, our enemies are totalitarians, holding a creed of power with no place for human dignity. Now, as then, they seek to impose a joyless conformity, to control every life and all of life.” Combined with frequent mentions of 9/11, this tactic adds another historical layer to what James Druckman and Justin Holmes define as the “presidential priming effect” (Druckman and Holmes 765). By focusing on specific aspects of identity, and connecting them to a single policy issue, Bush hopes to bolster support for his agenda and to deflect attention from areas where he may be underperforming, such as the economy.

Using these strategies, Bush framed the War on Terror as a crisis of identity within the American public, which limited the likelihood of well publicized dissent. Even within mainstream media, little arguments were forwarded against the invasion of Iraq, and only one Congressperson voted against the Authorization of Military Force against Iraq passed in October 2002 (Gershkoff and Kushner 529). This is not to suggest that there were no people forwarding arguments against the administration, as international backlash was fairly potent and there were protests within the United States. It does, however, suggest that those criticisms were not able to effectively counter Bush’s rhetoric of national identity. The lack of criticism once again suggests that Bush’s rhetoric was effective in creating contextual conditions to further his policies, as even traditional rivals within Congress acceded to his agenda.

Role 3: Definition as A Political Act

The final role rhetoric plays in creating material change is through the use of rhetorical definition as a political act, motivating support for one’s position while at the same time making it difficult to express dissent without appearing as sympathizing with the “enemy.” Terrorism in itself is political speech. It expresses a perceived grievance with some government or regime in hopes of intimidating them to change or simply to inspire others to cause havoc through violent means. And on the opposite side, defining a political act as terrorism delegitimizes that group and their grievance. In the context of the War in Iraq, we have already seen how Bush linked the Hussein regime to terrorists, thereby delegitimizing their authority to rule and justifying military action. But in addition, as alluded to in the first section of analysis, defining and naming your own political actions also has consequences. In choosing names like “The Patriot Act,” “Operation Enduring Freedom,” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” the Bush Administration publicly defined their “goals” for military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the implementation of an unprecedented surveillance and intelligence-sharing program. Once again, this is an example of the rhetorical enaction of policy, where not only does Bush’s speech reflect a sense of American Identity, but so does the policy itself.

Another defining—pun intended—act of the Administration was coining the phrase “War on Terror.” Bush first used this phrase during his address to Congress on September 20, 2001, saying “Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there.” When describing his political agenda, Bush frequently uses the phrase but also builds rhetorical militarism as a tactic within speech. Bush himself recognized the subtle inadequacy in using the phrase on its own. “Terror” is not a state, it does not possess a standing army, and it is impossible to understand as even one holistic group. All the same, in the First State of the Union Address he declares “we have a great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.” Defining an ongoing military operation in terms of a war and invoking a sense of martial law, Bush determines not only what response is expected from Congresspeople, but the American populace writ large. Namely, as David Zarefsky argues: “national unity, quick response without debate or deliberation, rallying around the president, overt displays of patriotism and national pride” (Zarefsky 617).

This framing of life and death, defeat and victory, helps justify unilateral presidential action and lessens the likelihood of dissent. Bush even makes direct appeals to citizens, repeatedly using the plural pronoun “we” and making remarks such as this one delivered over radio on September 15, 2001: “You will be asked for your patience -- for the conflict will not be short. You will be asked for resolve -- for the conflict will not be easy. You will be asked for your strength, because the course to victory may be long.” This collective sense is echoed again during his first address to Congress when he says, “I ask for your patience, with the delays and inconveniences that may accompany tighter security; and for your patience in what will be a long struggle.” This strengthens the dynamic discussed in role 2 whereby democratic deliberation is rhetorically limited in the name of national security. Here Bush seems to create the rules for the rhetorical situation itself through definition, which delegitimizes what political speech is seen as relevant or acceptable.