“What Bush Said: The War on Terror and the Rhetorical Situation”

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About the Author

Ross Fitzpatrick is an undergraduate student at the University of Kansas, double majoring in English and Political Science. He is also a member of the university’s policy debate team and the Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society.

Contents

Introduction

Methods: Rhetorical Analysis

Analysis/Results: Events Producing Speech

Analysis/Results: Speech Producing Action

Conclusion

References

Appendix A: Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework Graphic

Appendix B: Table of Speeches and Rhetorical Roles Identified

Analysis/Results: Events Producing Speech

The events of September 11, 2001, undoubtedly changed the world. Terrorists later linked to the organization Al-Qaeda hijacked four airplanes and crashed two of them into the twin towers of the World Trade Center and one at the Pentagon. The fourth plane was misdirected by passengers aboard the flight and crash landed in a field in Pennsylvania. In total, 2,996 people were killed including passengers, first responders, and countless other innocent individuals. It was perhaps the greatest American tragedy since Pearl Harbor in 1941. And clearly, it necessitated a response from President Bush. The question is, was there only one “fitting response,” as claimed by Bitzer? That is, in this case, did events necessitate speech?

Bush delivered a total of three speeches on September 11, one at Emma Booker Elementary School, one at the Barksdale Air Force base, and a third at the Oval Office in a formal address to the nation.¹ The speeches were obviously a response to the events of that day, grieving for the loss of life and responding to those who committed the acts. However, other than this first example, a national tragedy, the conditions that necessitated speech are somewhat unclear. Most of the speeches delivered across the timespan analyzed seemed either erratically initiated or part of the regular functioning of the office – speeches like the annual State of the Union Address, regular press conferences, and military academy commencement speeches.

However, this isn’t to say there was no exigence, but rather that the exigence is unclear and messy. For example, it is worth noting many of the speeches coincided with past policies or new military initiatives, such as Bush’s speeches after the passage of the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2001, or an address on operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003. In these rarer instances, the exigence seems relatively obvious: a new bill is passed into law. But these speeches were as much about rhetorically enacting these policies as they were responding to their passage or signing them into law. It is unclear whether any of the speeches analyzed were specific responses to individual military operations or strategically important events in Afghanistan or Iraq. Updates on the functioning of military operations were given in some of the speeches but in relatively little detail, with almost no references to specific skirmishes or combat zones.

Still, Bush delivered three speeches clearly necessitated by the passage of policy or development of military operations. First was a speech delivered on October 7, 2001, explaining Operation Enduring Freedom to the public. This was correlated with the initiation of air strikes on Al-Qaeda training camps and Taliban bases in Afghanistan. Two weeks earlier Bush had delivered a speech in an address to Congress making demands on the Taliban to give up Al-Qaeda leaders and vacate Afghanistan. As Bush explained during his address on Operation Enduring Freedom, “None of these demands were met. And now, the Taliban will pay a price.” In explaining the purpose of the operation Bush declared, “we defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear.” Here, as the name of the operation suggests, Bush rhetorically frames the military operation as an extension of freedom to the peoples of the world. In this way, Bush not only responds to the Taliban, but rhetorically initiates action by declaring the operation publicly and further cements a commitment to an ideal of freedom which softens the unsavory aspects of a military operation.

Similarly, but perhaps even more obviously, Bush rhetorically enacted the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2001, by saying at the conclusion of his speech, “It is now my honor to sign into law the USA Patriot Act of 2001.” In this instance, Bush pairs the action of signing a bill with a verbal statement of passage. Bush rhetorically counters potential criticisms of the wide-reaching surveillance program throughout the speech, framing it specifically in the terms of counterterrorism, although many of the program’s provisions have been used in everyday criminal investigations. He says, “This bill met with an overwhelming -- overwhelming agreement in Congress, because it upholds and respects the civil liberties guaranteed by our Constitution.” And he frames the purpose of the law in morally absolutist terms, arguing “This legislation is essential not only to pursuing and punishing terrorists, but also preventing more atrocities in the hands of the evil ones.” And by referring to the United States as “a nation at war,” he justifies the bill as necessary to counter an imminent threat. And again, by naming the bill the “Patriot Act,” the administration frames the bill with nationalist language, which appeals to a sense of traditional American ideals. Throughout the speech, Bush doesn’t simply describe the provisions of the Patriot Act, but frames them in a certain context in order to emphasize its strengths and downplay criticisms.

Almost two years later, Bush delivered a speech on the initiation of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19th, 2003, coinciding with the beginning of troop deployment in Iraq. Here, Bush uses potential future scenarios to justify the bill and appeal to the same sense of morality present in the two previous examples. He declares, “We will pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail.” Bush not only initiates military operations but frames their purpose and even predicts the outcome in order to justify intervention and assure the population that “decisive force” is the only possible solution. In line with Kingdon’s theory, Bush frames only one potential solution derived from the policy stream. In rhetorical enactment, the president not only creates action but frames that action as the only one that could possibly be taken.

All this to say, Bitzer’s explanation of the rhetorical situation does have value, especially in relation to policy enactment. Rhetoric certainly plays a vital role in manipulating policy windows to produce action, but events are essential to the opening of those windows. Absent 9/11, there is no political justification for the War in Afghanistan, creation of a new cabinet position at the Department of Homeland Security, or massive increases in surveillance. No matter how one interprets Bush’s rhetoric on the War on Terror and its connection to policy, that rhetoric is at its core a response to that contingent event. What I will explore in the next section, however, is whether there is one single “fitting” response, or rather a multitude of responses that individuals choose to “fit” their own political agenda.