"Mimetics as Digital Culture"

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About the Author

Jacklyn Heslop has her B.A from California State University, Stanislaus and is currently working on her M.A in English with a special emphasis on rhetoric and the teaching of writing at the same institution. She hopes to continue on to her PhD in order to continue her studies into memetics and/or writing centers. In addition to those already stated, her research interests are multimodal pedagogy, digital and visual rhetorics, and alternative forms of assessment (specs/contract grading).

Contents

Introduction

The Enthymeme: Filling in Missing Pieces

Cultural Inheritance: Darwin to Digital Rhetoric

Meme Creation and Reproduction

Enthymemes and Visual: Is There an Argument?

Reading the Meme

Conclusion: The Start of a Memetic Enthymeme

Works Cited

The Enthymeme: Filling in Missing Pieces

To begin, Aristotle’s impact on rhetoric is profound but focus for the purpose of this paper will be on his definition and explanation of the enthymeme. An enthymeme is what Aristotle calls “a rhetorical syllogism,” a form of logical reasoning in which one proposition is missing and must be filled in by the audience (6). For example, a syllogism would be: This restaurant requires customers to wear a tie. He is not wearing a tie. Therefore, he cannot buy food from the restaurant. The enthymeme leaves out one portion of the syllogism, which the audience completes themselves. In continuing the example above, if a man were to look at his outfit and state, “This restaurant requires customers to wear a tie, so I cannot eat at this restaurant” then it can be inferred that he is not wearing a tie. Aristotle explains that “The enthymeme must consist of a few propositions, fewer often than those which make the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself” (7). While stating all three propositions would create a clear line of reasoning, it may be redundant and less persuasive to force the connection when the audience is capable of coming to the same conclusion with their own faculties.

The enthymeme, much like the meme as I will argue, has its own grammar and structure that allows it to be interpreted by the audience. The missing portion that demotes the syllogism to enthymeme is crafted in consideration of the shared understanding of social, economic, or historical knowledge. Ed Dyck uses formal logic in connection with an explanation of the enthymeme to demonstrate that “a topos is an element (a part) of an enthymeme, that is, a thing out of which an enthymeme is constructed” (109). To Aristotle, topoi, otherwise called the topic, refers to a strategy that the speaker uses to help drive his speech. He explains, “Not all facts can form his basis, but only those that bear on the matter in hand . . . Consequently, as appears in the Topics, we must first of all have by us a selection of arguments about questions that may arise that are suitable for us to handle; and . . . the more closely [the facts] bear upon it, the more they will seem to belong to that speech only instead of being a commonplace” (Aristotle 17). The common topoi attempt to establish universal ground, whereas close facts create particular topoi. Commonplaces include calls to nationalistic beliefs, American vs. European, while particular topoi are meant for a particular audience; for example, facts about a motorcycle vs. a hybrid car would only interest specific people. It is explicit references to the topoi the Dyck argues is left out when crafting the enthymeme; since the very nature of a topoi is familiar to the intended audience, it is unnecessary to include it.